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This paper discusses the role that impact evaluations should play in scaling up. Cred-
ible impact evaluations are needed to ensure that the most effective programs are
scaled up at the national or international levels. Scaling up is possible only if a case
can be made that programs that have been successful on a small scale would work in
other contexts. Therefore the very objective of scaling up implies that learning from
experience is possible. 
Because programs that have been shown to be successful can be replicated in other
countries while unsuccessful programs can be abandoned, impact evaluations are
international public goods, thus the international agencies should have a key role in
promoting and financing them. In doing this, they would achieve three important
objectives: improve the rates of return on the programs they support, improve the
rates of return on the programs other policymakers support by providing evidence on
the basis of which programs can be selected, and build long-term support for inter-
national aid and development by making it possible to credibly signal what programs
work and what programs do not work. 
The paper argues that considerable scope exists for expanding the use of ran-
domized evaluations. For a broad class of development programs, randomized
evaluation can be used to overcome the problems often encountered when using
current evaluation practices. 
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Introduction 
Scaling up and evaluation are often presented as conflicting objectives, and for most
international development agencies, “going to scale” has to be given priority. The
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), for example, lists as its first priority for
HIV/AIDS education “moving away from small scale pilot projects” and “expanding
effective and promising approaches to national scale.”1 The trade-off is explicit: by
moving away from pilots and projects before their impact on behavior leading to
HIV/AIDS has been convincingly established, one has to commit to expanding proj-
ects that are only promising—not enough projects have been proven to be “effec-
tive.” The UNICEF web site on skill-based health education reports on 10 case stud-
ies of promising, school-based HIV/AIDS education programs, only one of which
presents differences in outcomes between a treatment group and a comparison group.
These approaches are the programs that UNICEF can recommend be implemented
on a national scale.2
This paper argues that for international agencies there is no real trade-off between
scaling up and evaluation. On the contrary, evaluation can give them an opportunity
to leverage the impact of their programs well beyond their ability to finance them.
The very idea of scaling up implies that the same programs can work in different
environments and that learning from experience is possible. Therefore reliable pro-
gram evaluations serve several purposes. First, a well-conducted evaluation can offer
insights into a particular project. For example, all programs should be subject to
process evaluations to ensure that funds are spent as intended and to receive feedback
from stakeholders on how programs could be improved. However, while process
evaluations are necessary, they are insufficient to determine program impact. A sec-
ond purpose of rigorous evaluations of programs’ impacts is that this information
can be shared with others. The benefits of knowing which programs work and which
do not extend far beyond any program or agency, and credible impact evaluations
are global public goods in the sense that they can offer reliable guidance to interna-
tional organizations, governments, donors, and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) in their ongoing search for effective programs. Thus when evaluation is used
to find out what works and what does not, the benefits extend far beyond the selec-
tion of projects within the organization. While a prospective impact evaluation may
require postponing the national expansion of a program for some time, evaluation
can be part of the backbone of a much larger expansion: that of the project on a
much larger scale (if proven successful), and that of the ability to fund development
projects. Providing these international public goods should be one of the important
missions of international organizations.
In this paper I argue that for a broad class of development programs, randomized
evaluations are a way to obtain credible and transparent estimates of program impact
that overcome the problems often encountered when using other evaluation practices.
Of course, not all programs can be evaluated with randomized evaluations; for exam-
ple, issues such as central bank independence must rely on other methods of evalua-
tion. Programs targeted to individuals or local communities, such as sanitation,
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education, and health programs and local government reforms, are likely to be strong
candidates for randomized evaluations. This paper does not recommend conducting
all evaluations with randomized methods; rather, it starts from the premise that there
is scope for substantially increasing their use, and that even a modest increase could
have a tremendous impact. 
This paper proceeds as follows: The next section presents the impact evaluation
problem and the opportunities for evaluation and discusses examples of evaluations,
drawn mostly from India. The following section discusses the potential of random-
ized evaluation as a basis for scaling up. The paper then turns to current practices
and the role international agencies can play in promoting and financing rigorous
evaluations, and then the paper concludes.
The Methodology of Randomized Evaluation
This section discusses the methodology of randomized evaluation: the problem it
tries to solve, and the solution it provides. It presents various examples where the
methodology is applied. 
The Evaluation Problem 
Any impact evaluation attempts to answer essentially counterfactual questions: How
would individuals who did benefit from the program have fared in the absence of the
program? How would those who did not benefit have fared if they had been exposed
to the program? The difficulty with these questions is immediate: at a given point in
time, an individual is observed either exposed to the program or not exposed. Com-
paring the same individual over time will not, in most cases, provide a reliable esti-
mate of the impact the program had on him or her, because many other things may
have changed at the same time that the program was introduced. We therefore cannot
seek to obtain an estimate of the impact of the program on each individual. All we can
hope for is to be able to obtain the average impact of the program on a group of indi-
viduals by comparing them with a similar group that was not exposed to the program. 
Thus the critical objective of impact evaluation is to establish a credible compari-
son group, that is, a group of individuals who, in the absence of the program, would
have had outcomes similar to those who were exposed to the program. This group
gives us an idea of what would have happened to the program group if it had not
been exposed, and thus allows us to obtain an estimate of the average impact on the
group in question. Generally, in the real world, individuals who were subjected to the
program and those who were not are very different, because programs are placed in
specific areas (for example, poorer or richer areas), individuals are screened for par-
ticipation in the program (for instance, on the basis of poverty or on the basis of their
motivation), and the decision to participate is often voluntary. For all these reasons,
those who were not exposed to a program are often not comparable to those who
were. Any difference between them could be attributed to two factors: preexisting
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differences (the so-called selection bias) and the impact of the program. Because we
have no reliable way to estimate the size of the selection bias, we cannot decompose
the overall difference into a treatment effect and a bias term.
To solve this problem, program evaluations typically need to be carefully planned
in advance to determine which group is a likely comparison group. One situation
where the selection bias disappears is when the treatment and the comparison groups
are selected randomly from a potential population of beneficiaries (individuals, com-
munities, schools, or classrooms can be selected into the program). In this case, on
average, we can be assured that those who are exposed to the program are no dif-
ferent than those who are not, and that a statistically significant difference between
them in the outcomes that the program was planning to affect after the program is
in place can be confidently attributed to the program. I will now discuss several
examples of randomized evaluations. 
Prospective Randomized Evaluations
Random selection of treatment and comparison groups can happen in several cir-
cumstances: during a pilot project because the program’s resources are limited, or
because the program itself calls for random beneficiaries. The next two subsections
discuss examples of these different scenarios. In addition, in some circumstances
where a program was not randomly allocated, because of favorable circumstances a
credible control group nevertheless exists. 
Pilot Projects 
Before a program is launched on a large scale, a pilot project, necessarily limited in
scope, is often implemented. In most circumstances, the beneficiaries of the pilot can
be randomly chosen, because many potential sites (or individuals) are equally good
locations for the project. The pilot can then be used not only to find out if the pro-
gram turns out to be feasible (which is what most pilots are currently used for) but
also whether the program has the expected impacts. Job training and income main-
tenance programs are prominent examples of randomized evaluations. A growing
number of such pilot projects are evaluated, often by means of collaboration between
an NGO and academics (see, for example, Kremer 2003 for several references). To
illustrate briefly how such studies can work in practice, consider an example from
India analyzed in Banerjee and others (2001). This study evaluated a program where
an Indian NGO, Seva Mandir, decided to hire second teachers for the nonformal edu-
cation centers it runs in villages. Nonformal schools seek to provide basic numeracy
and literacy skills to children who do not attend formal school and, in the medium
term, to help mainstream these children into the regular school system. These centers
are plagued by high teacher and child absenteeism. A second teacher, often a woman,
was randomly assigned to 21 out of 42 schools. The hope was to increase the num-
ber of days the school was open, to increase children’s participation, and to improve
performance by providing more individualized attention to the children. By provid-
ing a female teacher, the NGO also hoped to make school more attractive for girls.
Teacher and child attendance were regularly monitored in program and comparison
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schools for the entire duration of the project. The impact of the program on learning
was measured by testing children at the end of the school year. The program reduced
the number of days schools were closed: one-teacher schools were closed
39 percent of the time, whereas two-teacher schools were closed 24 percent of the
time. Girls’ attendance increased by 50 percent. However, test scores did not differ. 
Carefully evaluated pilot projects form a sound basis for the decision to scale the
project up. In the example just discussed, the NGO did not implement the two-
teacher program on a full scale on the grounds that its benefits did not outweigh its
costs. The NGO used the savings to expand other programs. 
By contrast, positive results can help build consensus for a project that has the
potential to be extended far beyond the scale that was initially envisioned. The PRO-
GRESA program (subsequently renamed as PROGRESA-Oportunidades) in Mexico
is the most striking example of this phenomenon.3 PROGRESA offers grants, dis-
tributed to women, conditional on children’s school attendance and preventative
health measures (nutrition supplementation, health care visits, and participation in
health education programs). In 1998, when the program was launched, Mexican
government officials made a conscious decision to take advantage of the fact that
budgetary constraints made it impossible to reach the 50,000 potential beneficiary
communities of PROGRESA all at once, and instead started with a pilot program in
506 communities. Half of those were randomly selected to receive the program, and
baseline and subsequent data were collected in the remaining communities (Gertler
and Boyce 2001). Part of the rationale for starting with this pilot program was to
increase the probability that the program would be continued in case of a change in
the party in power. The proponents of the program understood that to be scaled up
successfully, the program would require continuous political support. 
The task of evaluating the program was given to academic researchers through
the International Food Policy Research Institute. The data were made accessible
to many different people, and a number of papers have been written on the pro-
gram’s impact (most of them are accessible on the institute’s web site).4 The eval-
uations showed that PROGRESA was effective in improving health and educa-
tion. Comparing PROGRESA beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries, Gertler and
Boyce (2001) show that children had about a 23 percent reduction in the incidence
of illness, a 1 to4 percent increase in height, and an 18 percent reduction in ane-
mia. Adults experienced a reduction of 19 percent in the number of days of work
lost because of illness. Shultz (forthcoming) finds an average of a 3.4 percent
increase in enrollment for all students in grades 1 through 8. The increase was
largest among girls who had completed grade 6: 14.8 percent.
In part because the program had been shown to be successful, it was indeed main-
tained when the Mexican government changed hands: by 2000 it was reaching
2.6 million families (10 percent of the families in Mexico) and had a budget of
US$800 million or 0.2 percent of Mexico’s gross domestic product (Gertler and Boyce
2001). It was subsequently expanded to urban communities, and, with support from
the World Bank, several neighboring Latin American countries are implementing sim-
ilar programs. Mexican officials transformed a budgetary constraint into an opportu-
nity and made evaluation the cornerstone of subsequent scaling up. They were
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rewarded by the expansion of the program and by the tremendous visibility that it
acquired. 
Replication and Evaluation of Existing Projects 
A criticism often heard against the evaluation of pilot projects is that pilot projects
may be different from regular projects. The fact that pilot projects are evaluated can
create problems with the interpretation of the results. If the project is unsuccessful,
it may be because it faced implementation problems during the first phase of the
program. If it is successful, it may be because more resources were allocated to it
than would have been under a more realistic scenario, because the context was
favorable, or because the participants in the experiment had a sense of being part of
something and changed their behavior. Moreover, all programs are implemented
under particular circumstances, and the conclusions may be hard to generalize. 
A first answer to some of these concerns is to replicate successful (as well as poten-
tially successful) experiments in different contexts. This has two advantages. First, in
the process of transplanting a program, circumstances will require changes, and the
program will show its robustness if its effectiveness survives these changes. Second,
obtaining several estimates in different contexts will provide some guidance about
whether the impacts of the program differ significantly for different groups. Replica-
tion of the initial evaluation study in the new context does not imply delaying full-
scale implementation of the program if the latter is justified on the basis of existing
knowledge. More often than not, the introduction of the program can only proceed
in stages, and the evaluation only requires that beneficiaries be phased into the pro-
gram in random order. 
Two studies on school-based health interventions provide a good illustration of
these two benefits. The first study (Miguel and Kremer 2004) evaluates a program
of twice-yearly, school-based mass treatment with inexpensive deworming drugs in
Kenya, where the prevalence of intestinal worms among children is high. Seventy-
five schools were phased into the program in random order. Health and school par-
ticipation improved not only at program schools, but also at nearby schools because
of reduced disease transmission. Absenteeism in treatment schools was 25 percent
(or 7 percentage points) lower than in comparison schools. Including this spillover
effect, the program increased schooling by 0.15 years per person treated. Combined
with estimates about the rates of return to schooling, the estimates suggest
extremely high rates of return of the deworming intervention. The authors estimate
that deworming increases the net present value of wages by more than US$30 per
treated child at a cost of only US$0.49.
One of the authors then decided to examine whether these results generalized
among preschoolers in urban India (Bobonis, Miguel, and Sharma 2002). The base-
line revealed that, even though worm infection was present, the levels of infection were
substantially lower than in Kenya (in India, “only” 27 percent of children suffer from
some form of worm infection, compared with 92 percent in Kenya). However, 70 per-
cent of children had moderate to severe anemia. The program was therefore modified
to include iron supplementation. It was administered through a network of preschools
SCALING UP AND EVALUATION |   347
in urban India. After one year of treatment, the authors found a nearly 50 percent
reduction in moderate to severe anemia, large weight gains, and a 7 percent reduction
in absenteeism among four- to six-year-olds (but not for younger children). The results
of the previous evaluation were thus by and large vindicated.5
A second answer is to evaluate the impact of programs that have already shown
their potential to be implemented on a large scale. In this case, concerns about the
ability to expand the program are moot, at least at the level at which it was imple-
mented. It may also make evaluating the program in several sites at the same time
easier, thereby alleviating some of the concerns about external validity. A natural
occasion for such evaluation is when the program is ready to expand, and the
expansion can be phased in in random order. 
The evaluation of a remedial education program by Banerjee and others
(2003) is an example of this approach. The program has been run by Pratham,
an Indian NGO, which implemented it in 1994. Pratham now reaches more than
161,000 children in 20 cities. The remedial education program hires a young
woman from the children’s community to provide remedial education in govern-
ment schools to children who have reached grades 2, 3, or 4 without having mas-
tered the basic grade 1 competencies. Children who are identified as lagging behind
are pulled out of their regular classroom for two hours a day to receive this instruc-
tion. Pratham wanted to evaluate the impact of this program, one of their flagship
interventions, at the same time as they were looking to expand. The expansion into
a new city, Vadodara, provided an opportunity to conduct a randomized evaluation.
In the first year (1999–2000), the program was expanded to 49 randomly selected
schools out of the 123 Vadodara government schools. In 2000–01, the program was
expanded to all the schools, but half the schools got a remedial teacher for grade 3
and half got one for grade 4. Grade 3 students in schools that got the program in
grade 4 served as the comparison group for grade 3 students in schools who got the
program in grade 3. At the same time, a similar intervention was conducted in a dis-
trict of Mumbai, where half the schools got the remedial teachers in grade 2 and
half got them in grade 3. The program was continued for one more year, with the
schools switching groups. Thus the program was conducted in several grades, in two
cities, and with no school feeling that it had been deprived of resources relative to
the others, because all schools benefited from the program. 
After two years, the program increased the average test score by 0.39 standard
deviations, which represents an increase of 3.2 points out of a possible 100 (the mean
in the control group was 32.4 points), and had an even stronger impact on the test
scores of those children who had low scores initially (an increase of 3.7 points, or 0.6
standard deviation, on a basis of 10.8 points). The impact of the program is rising
over time, but it is similar across cities and genders. Hiring remedial education teach-
ers from the community appears to be 10 times more cost-effective than hiring new
teachers. One can be relatively confident in recommending the scaling up of this pro-
gram, at least in India, on the basis of these estimates, because the program was con-
tinued for a period of time, it was evaluated in two quite different contexts, and it
has shown its ability to be rolled out on a large scale. 
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Program-Induced Randomization
In some instances, fairness or transparency considerations make randomization the
best way to choose the recipients of a program. Such programs are natural candidates
for evaluation, because the evaluation exercise does not require any modification of
the program’s design. 
When some schools are oversubscribed, allocation to particular schools is often
done by lottery. In some school systems in the United States, students have the option
of applying to so-called magnet schools or schools with special programs, and admis-
sion is often granted by lottery. Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2002) use this feature to
evaluate the impact of school choice in the Chicago school system by comparing lot-
tery winners and losers. Because each school runs its own lottery, their paper is, in
effect, taking advantage of 1,000 different lotteries. They find that lottery winners
are less likely to attend their neighborhood schools than lottery losers, but more
likely to remain in the Chicago school system. However, their subsequent perform-
ance is actually worse than that of lottery losers. This is in sharp contrast to expec-
tations and what a “naive” comparison would have found. When one simply com-
pares the results of all the children who attended the school of their choice to the
results of all those who did not, one finds that the results of children who attended a
school of their choice are indeed better than the results of those who did not. The
results from the randomized evaluation show, however, that, if anything, the causal
effect of attending a school of one’s choice is negative. The “naive” difference, which
is positive, simply reflects the fact that the children who decided to change schools
were highly motivated. 
Voucher programs constitute another example of programs that often feature a
lottery. The sponsor of the program allocates only a limited budget to the program,
the program is oversubscribed, and a lottery is used to pick the beneficiaries. Angrist
and others (2002) evaluate a Colombian program in which vouchers for private
schools were allocated by lottery because of the program’s limited budget. Vouchers
were renewable conditional on satisfactory academic performance. The authors
compare lottery winners and losers. Lottery winners were 15 to 20 percent more
likely to attend private school; 10 percent more likely to complete grade 8; and
scored 0.2 standard deviations higher on standardized tests, equivalent to a full
grade level. Winners were substantially more likely to graduate from high school
and scored higher on high school completion and college entrance examinations.
The benefits of this program to participants clearly exceeded the costs, which were
similar to the costs of providing a public school place.
When nationwide policies include some randomization aspect, this provides a
unique opportunity to evaluate a policy that has already been scaled up in several
locations. The knowledge gained from this experience can be used to inform policy
decisions to expand the policy in the countries, to continue with the program, or to
expand the policy in other countries. However, because the randomization is part of
the program design rather than a deliberate attempt to make evaluating it possible,
the data necessary for the evaluation are not always available. International agencies
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can play two key roles in this respect. First, they can organize and finance limited
data collection efforts. Second, they can encourage governments and statistical offices
to link up existing data sources that can be used to evaluate the experiments. Set-
asides for women and minorities in the decentralized government in India (the pan-
chayat system) are an interesting example. In 1993, the 73rd amendment to the Con-
stitution of India required the states to set up a three-tiered panchayat system (village,
block, and district levels), directly elected by the people, to administer local public
goods. Elections must take place every five years, and panchayat councils have the
latitude to decide how to allocate local infrastructure expenditures. The amendment
also required that one-third of all positions (council members and council chairs) be
reserved for women, and that a share equal to the representation of disadvantaged
minorities (scheduled castes and scheduled tribes) be reserved for these minorities. To
avoid any possible manipulation, the law stipulated that the reserved positions be
randomly allocated. 
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (forthcoming) evaluate the impact of reserving seats
for women in West Bengal. They collected data on 465 villages across 165 councils
in 1 district, and find that women tend to allocate more resources to drinking water
and roads and less to education. This corresponds to the priorities men and women
expressed through their complaints to panchayats. Then they collected the same data
in a poor district of Rajasthan, Udaipur. They find that in Rajasthan, women invest
more in drinking water and less on roads, and that this once again corresponds to
the complaints expressed by men and women. These results were obtained in two
very different districts with different histories: West Bengal had had a panchayat since
1978, while Rajasthan had none until 1995, plus Rajasthan has particularly low
female literacy among Indian states. Thus the results suggest that the gender of policy-
makers matters in both more and less developed political systems. Furthermore, it
provides indirect, but powerful, evidence that local elected officials do have power
even in relatively young systems. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (forthcoming) also eval-
uate the impact of reservations for scheduled castes and find that a larger share of
goods is assigned to scheduled caste hamlets when the head of a panchayat is from a
scheduled caste. 
In principle, the data to evaluate the impact of this experiment on a much larger
scale are available: village-level census data are available for 1991 and will become
available for 2001. The National Sample Survey Organization conducts large-scale
consumption and labor surveys every five years, with detailed data on outcomes.
However, administrative barriers make these data difficult to use for the purpose of
evaluating this program, because the census does not contain any information about
which panchayat a village belongs to. In addition, the information about panchayat
reservations and composition is not centralized, even at the state level, and is avail-
able only at the district level. Likewise, the National Sample Survey contains no
information about panchayats. This is an example where, at a relatively small cost,
information could be made available that would be useful for evaluating an
extremely large program. It requires coordinating various people and agencies, a
task that international organizations should be well placed to accomplish.
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Other Methods to Control for Selection Biases
Natural or organized randomized experiments are not the only methodology that
can be used to obtain credible impact evaluation of program effects. To compen-
sate for the lack of randomized evaluations, researchers have developed alternative
techniques to control for selection bias as best as possible. Labor economists in
particular have made tremendous progress. (For excellent technical and nontech-
nical surveys of the various techniques, their value, and their limitations, see, for
example, Angrist and Krueger 1999, 2001; Card 1999; and Meyer 1995.) Here I
briefly mention some of the techniques that are most popular with researchers. 
One strategy is to try to find a control group that is as comparable as possible
with the treatment group, at least along observable dimensions. This can be done by
collecting as many covariates as possible, and adjusting the computed differences
through a regression or by matching the program and the comparison group, that
is, by forming a comparison group that is as similar as possible to the program
group. One way to proceed is to predict the probability that a given individual is in
the comparison or the treatment group on the basis of all the available observable
characteristics and to form a comparison group by picking people who have the
same probability of being treated as those who actually got treated. Rosenbaum
(1995) refers to this as propensity score matching. The challenge with this method,
as with regression controls, is that it hinges on having identified all the potentially
relevant differences between treatment and control groups. In cases where treatment
is assigned on the basis of a variable that is not observed by the researcher, such as
demand for the service, this technique will lead to misleading inferences. 
When a good argument can be made that the outcome would not have had dif-
ferential trends in regions that received the program if the program had not been put
in place, it is possible to compare the growth in the variables of interest between pro-
gram and nonprogram regions (this is often called the difference-in-differences tech-
nique). Whether the argument is good and the identification assumptions are justi-
fied is, however, often hard to judge. This identification assumption cannot be tested,
and to even ascertain its plausibility, one needs to have long time series of data from
before the program was implemented to be able to compare trends over long enough
periods. One also needs to make sure that no other program was implemented at the
same time, which is often not the case. Finally, when drawing inferences, one needs
to take into account that regions are often affected by time-persistent shocks, which
may look like a program effect (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004). 
Duflo (2001) takes advantage of a rapid school expansion program that took place
in Indonesia in the 1970s to estimate the impact of building schools on schooling and
subsequent wages. Identification is made possible because the allocation rule for
schools is known (more schools were built in places with low initial enrollment rates),
and because the cohorts benefiting from the program are easily identified (children 12
or older when the program started did not benefit from the program). The faster
growth of education across cohorts in regions that got more schools suggests that
access to schools contributed to increased education. The trends were similar before
the program and shifted clearly for the first cohort that was exposed to the program,
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which reinforces confidence in the identification assumption. This identification strat-
egy is not often valid, however. Frequently when policy changes are used to identify
the effect of a particular policy, the policy change is itself endogenous to the outcomes
it tried to affect, which makes identification impossible (see Besley and Case 2000).
Program rules often generate discontinuities that can be used to identify the
effects of the program by comparing those who were just above the threshold to
qualify for a program to those who were just below the threshold. For example, if
scholarships are allocated on the basis of a certain number of points, one can com-
pare those just above to those just below the threshold. Angrist and Lavy (1999)
use this technique, known as regression discontinuity design (Campbell 1969) to
evaluate the impact of class size in Israel. In Israel, a second teacher is allocated
whenever the size of a class would be larger than 40 children. This generates dis-
continuities in class size when the enrollment in a grade goes from 40 to 41 (class
size changes from 40 to 20 and 21), 80 to 81, and so on. Angrist and Lavy com-
pare test score performance in schools just above and just below the threshold and
find that those just above the threshold have significantly higher test scores than
those just below, which can confidently be attributed to the class size, because it
is difficult to imagine that schools on both sides of the threshold have any other
systematic differences. Discontinuities in program rules, when enforced, are thus
a source of identification. However, they often are not enforced, especially in
developing countries. For example, researchers tried to use the discontinuity in
Grameen Bank, the flagship micro-credit organization in Bangladesh that lends
only to people who own less than one acre of land (Pitt and Khandker 1998), as
a source of identification. However, in practice Grameen Bank lends to many peo-
ple who own more than one acre of land, and there is no discontinuity in the prob-
ability for borrowing at the threshold (Morduch 1998). In developing countries
rules are probably frequently not enforced strictly enough to generate discontinu-
ities that can be used for identification purposes. 
Alternatives to randomized evaluation exist, and they are useful; however, identi-
fication issues need to be tackled with extreme care and they are never self-evident.
They generate intense debate in academic circles whenever such a study is conducted.
Identification is less transparent, and more subject to divergence of opinion, than in
the case of randomized experiments. The difference between good and bad evalua-
tions of this type is thus more difficult to communicate. The study and the results are
also less easy to convey to policymakers in an effective way with all the caveats that
need to accompany them. This suggests that, while a mix of randomized and non-
randomized evaluation is necessary, international organizations should commit
themselves to running some randomized evaluations.
Scaling Up and Randomized Evaluations
The previous section showed that when programs’ beneficiaries are individuals or
communities, rather than an entire country, for example, randomized evaluations are
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often a possible way to obtain reliable estimates of the programs’ effects. This section
discusses how the results of these evaluations can be used to scale up development
programs.
Obtaining Reliable Estimates of Program Impact
When the evaluation is not planned ex ante, to evaluate the impact of a program
researchers must resort to before and after comparisons (when a baseline was con-
ducted), or to comparisons between beneficiaries and communities that, for some
reason, were not exposed to the program. When the reasons why some people
were exposed to the program and some were not are unknown, or worse, when
they are known to be likely to introduce selection bias, those comparisons are
likely to be biased. The data collection is often as expansive as for a randomized
evaluation, but the inferences are biased. As argued earlier, controlling for observ-
able differences between treatment and control groups through a regression analy-
sis or propensity score matching will correct for the bias only if beneficiaries and
nonbeneficiaries are known with certainty to be comparable conditional on these
characteristics. This is unlikely to be true unless the program was randomly allo-
cated conditional on these characteristics. In particular, a project officer trying to
optimally allocate a program typically has more information than a researcher,
and will (and should) make use of it when allocating resources. 
These concerns have serious practical implications. Studies comparing experi-
mental and nonexperimental estimates with the same data show that the results
from randomized evaluation can be quite different from those drawn from non-
randomized evaluation. In a celebrated analysis of job training programs,
LaLonde (1986) finds that many of the econometric procedures and comparison
groups used in program evaluations did not yield accurate or precise estimates
and that such econometric estimates often differed significantly from experimen-
tal results. Glewwe and others (forthcoming) compare retrospective and prospec-
tive analyses of the effect of flip charts in schools on test scores. Retrospective
estimates using straightforward ordinary least squares regressions suggested that
flip charts raised test scores by up to 20 percent of a standard deviation, robust
to the inclusion of control variables, while difference-in-differences estimates sug-
gested a smaller effect of about 5 percent of a standard deviation, an effect that is
still significant, though sometimes only at the 10 percent level. In contrast,
prospective estimates based on randomized evaluations provided no evidence that
flip charts increased test scores. These results suggest that using retrospective data
to compare test scores seriously overestimates the charts’ effectiveness. A difference-
in-differences approach reduced, but did not eliminate, the problem and, more-
over, whether such a difference-in-differences approach has general applicability
is not clear. These examples suggest that ordinary least squares estimates are
biased upward rather than downward. This is plausible, because in a poor coun-
try with a substantial local role in education, inputs are likely to be correlated
with favorable, unobserved community characteristics. If the direction of omitted
SCALING UP AND EVALUATION |   353
variable biases were similar in other retrospective analyses of education inputs in
developing countries, the effects of inputs may be even more modest than retro-
spective studies suggest. 
Some of the results are more encouraging. For example, Buddelmeyer and
Skoufias (2003) use randomized evaluation results as a benchmark to examine the
performance of regression discontinuity design for evaluating the impact of the PRO-
GRESA program on child health and school attendance. The researchers found the
performance of regression discontinuity design in this case to be remarkably good:
impact estimates with this quasi-experimental method agreed with experimental evi-
dence in 10 out of 12 cases, and the 2 exceptions both occurred in the first year of
the program. Such research can provide invaluable guidance about the validity and
potential biases of quasi-experimental estimators.
Another important source of bias in program effects are publication biases. Posi-
tive results tend to receive a large amount of publicity. Agencies that implement pro-
grams seek publicity for their successful projects, and academics, as well as academic
journals, are much more interested in and able to publish positive results than mod-
est or insignificant results. However, many programs fail, and publication bias may
be substantial if only positive and significant results are published. 
The problem of publication bias may be much larger with retrospective evalua-
tions. Ex post the researchers or evaluators define their own comparison group, and
thus may be able to pick a variety of plausible comparison groups. In particular,
researchers obtaining negative results with retrospective techniques are likely to try
different approaches or not to publish. 
Available evidence suggests that the publication bias problem is severe (DeLong
and Lang 1992). In the case of natural experiments and instrumental variable esti-
mates, publication bias may actually more than compensate for the reduction in bias
caused by the use of an instrument, because they tend to have larger standard errors,
and researchers looking for significant results will select only large estimates. For
example, Ashenfelter, Harmon, and Oosterbeek (1999) provide strong evidence of
publication bias of instrumental variables estimates of the returns to education: on
average, the estimates with larger standard errors also tend to be larger. This
accounts for most of the oft-cited results that claim that instrumental estimates of the
returns to education are higher than ordinary least squares estimates. In contrast,
randomized evaluations commit in advance to a particular comparison group. Once
the work to conduct a prospective randomized evaluation has been done, researchers
just need to ensure that the results are documented and published even if the results
suggest quite modest effects, or even no effects at all (such as some of the studies dis-
cussed in this paper). As I discuss later, putting institutions in place to ensure that
negative results are systematically disseminated is important (such a system is already
in place for the results of medical trials).
Several sources of bias are specific to randomized evaluation, but they are well
known and can often be corrected for. The first possibility is that the initial random-
ization is not respected; for example, a local authority figure insists that the school
in his village be included in the group scheduled to receive the program, or parents
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manage to reallocate their children from a class or a school without the program to
a class or school with the program. Or conversely, individuals allocated to the treat-
ment group may not receive the treatment, for example, because they decide not to
take the program up. Even though the intended allocation of the program was ran-
dom, the actual allocation is not. In particular, the program will appear to be more
effective than it is in reality if individuals allocated to the program ex post also
receive more of other types of resources, which is plausible. This concern is real, and
evaluations certainly need to deal with it; however, it can be dealt with relatively eas-
ily. Even though the initial assignment does not guarantee in this case that someone
is actually either in the program or in the comparison group, in most cases it is at
least more likely that someone is in the program group if he or she was initially allo-
cated to it. The researcher can thus compare outcomes in the initially assigned group
(this difference is often called the intention to treat estimate) and scale up the differ-
ence by dividing it by the difference in the probability of receiving the treatment in
those two groups (Imbens and Angrist 1994). Krueger’s (1999) reanalysis of the
Tennessee student/teacher achievement ratio class size experiment used this method
to deal with the fact that some parents had managed to reallocate their children from
regular classes to small classes.6 Such methods will provide an estimate of the aver-
age effect of the treatment on those who were induced to take the treatment by the
randomization, for instance, on children who would have been in a large class had
they not been placed in the treatment groups. This may be different from the average
effect in the population, because people who anticipated benefiting more from the
program may be more likely to take advantage of it. It may, however, be a group that
policymakers especially care about, because they are likely to be the ones who are
more likely to take advantage of the policy if it is implemented on a large scale. 
A second possible source of bias is differential attrition in the treatment and com-
parison groups: those who benefit from the program may be less likely to move or
otherwise drop out of the sample than those who do not. For example, the two-
teacher program Banerjee and others (2001) analyze increased school attendance
and reduced dropout rates. This means that when a test was administered in the
schools, more children were present in the program schools than in the comparison
schools. If children who are prevented by the program from dropping out of school
are the weakest in the class, the comparison between the test scores of the children
in treatment and control schools may be biased downward. Statistical techniques
can be used to deal with this problem, but the most effective way is to try to limit
attrition as much as possible. For example, in the evaluation of the remedial educa-
tion program in India (Banerjee and others 2003), an attempt was made to track
down all children and administer the test to them, even if they had dropped out of
school. Only children who had left for their home villages were not tested. As a
result, the attrition rate remained relatively high, but was the same in the treatment
and comparison schools and does not invalidate test score comparisons. 
A third possible source of bias is when the comparison group is itself indirectly
affected by the treatment. For example, Miguel and Kremer’s (2004) study of the
Kenyan deworming program showed that children in treatment schools and in
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schools near the treatment schools were less likely to have worms, even if they were
not themselves given the medicine. The reason is that worms easily spread from one
person to another. In previous evaluations, treatment had been randomized within
schools. Its impact was thus underestimated, because even comparison children ben-
efited from the treatment. The solution in this case was to choose the school rather
than the pupils within a school as the unit of randomization. 
Randomizing across units—for example, across schools or communities rather
than individuals within a unit—is also often the only practical way to proceed. For
example, offering a program to some villagers and not others may be impossible, but
the fact that randomization takes places at the group rather than the individual level
needs to be explicitly taken into account when calculating the confidence interval of
the estimates of the impact of the program. Imagine, for example, that only two large
schools take part in a study, and that one school is chosen at random to receive new
textbooks. The differences in test scores between children in the two schools may
reflect many other characteristics of the treatment and comparison schools (for
example, the quality of the principal). Even if the sample of children is large, the sam-
ple of schools is actually small. The grouped nature of the data can easily be taken
into account, but it is important to take it into account when planning design and
sample size. 
In summary, while randomized evaluations are not a bullet-proof strategy, the
potential for biases is well known, and those biases can often be corrected. This
stands in sharp contrast with biases of most other types of studies, where the bias
caused by the nonrandom treatment assignment cannot be either signed or estimated. 
Generalizing the Results of Evaluation
Randomized evaluation can therefore provide reliable estimates of treatment effects
for the program and the population under study. To draw on these estimates to assess
the prospects for scaling up the program, however, one has to make the case that
these estimates tell us something about the effect of the program after it is scaled up.
There are different reasons why the results of a well-executed experiment may not be
generalizable.
First, the experiment itself may have affected the treatment or the comparison
samples, for example, the provision of inputs might temporarily increase morale
among beneficiaries, and this could improve performance (known as the Hawthorne
effect). While this would bias randomized evaluations, it would also bias fixed-effect
or difference-in-differences estimates. As mentioned earlier, either the treatment or
the comparison group may also be temporarily affected by being part of an experi-
ment (known as the John Henry effect). These effects are less likely to be present
when the evaluations are conducted on a large scale and over a long enough time
span, and some experimental designs can minimize the risk of such effects. For
example, in Pratham’s remedial education program analyzed by Banerjee and oth-
ers (2003), all the schools received the program, but not all the grades. Trying to
assess whether these effects are present is, however, important. In his reanalysis of
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the project student/teacher achievement ratio data, Krueger (1999) exploits variation
in class size within the control group occasioned by children’s departure during the
year to obtain a second estimate of the class size effect, which is, by definition, not
contaminated by John Henry or Hawthorne effects, because all the teachers in this
sample belong to the control group. He finds no difference in the estimates obtained
by these two methods. 
Second, treatment effects may be affected by the scale of the program. For exam-
ple, the Colombian voucher program Angrist and others (2002) analyze was imple-
mented on a pilot basis with a small sample, but the rest of the school system
remained unchanged, in particular, the number of students affected was too small to
have an impact on the composition of the public and private schools. If this program
were to be implemented on a large scale, it could affect the functioning of the school
system, and could therefore have a different impact (Hsieh and Urquiola 2002).
More generally, partial equilibrium treatment effects may be different from general
equilibrium treatment effects (Heckman, Lochner, and Taber 1998). Addressing
these problems requires randomized evaluation to be performed at the level of the
economy. This may be possible for programs such as voucher programs, where the
general equilibrium effects will likely take place at the community level, and where
communities can be randomly affected or not affected by the program, but I am not
aware of an evaluation of this type. 
Third, and perhaps most important, no project will be replicated exactly: circum-
stances vary and any idea will have to be adapted to local circumstances. In other
words, internal validity is not sufficient. The evaluation also needs to have some
external validity, that is, the results can be generalized beyond the population directly
under study. Some argue that evaluation can never generalize. In its most extreme
form (see, for example, Cronbach 1982; Cronbach and others 1980; see also the
review of the education literature in Cook 2001), this argument contends that every
school, for example, is specific and complex, and that nothing definitive can be
learned about schools in general. This discourse has made its way into some inter-
national organizations,7 but note that it is contradictory to the objective of going to
scale. What is the point of rolling out a program on a large scale if one thinks that,
for example, each school needs a different program? The very objective of scaling up
has to be founded on the postulate that even if the impact of a program varies across
individuals, thinking of average treatment effects makes sense. This is exactly the
postulate that underlies the external validity of randomized evaluations. 
A theory of why a specific program is likely to be effective is necessary to provide
some guidance about what elements in the program and in its context were keys to
its success. Theory will help disentangle the distinct components of a program and
discriminate between variants that are likely to be important and variants that are
not (Banerjee 2002). For example, an economic analysis of the PROGRESA program
suggests that it may have been useful because of its impact on income, because of its
effect on women’s bargaining power, or because of its effect on incentives. Aspects of
the program most likely to be relevant to the program’s success are the size of the
transfer, its recipient, and the conditionality attached to it. In contrast, the color of
SCALING UP AND EVALUATION |   357
the food supplement distributed to the families, for example, is unlikely to be impor-
tant. Replication of the programs may then vary these different aspects to determine
which of them is the most important. This also suggests that priority should be given
to evaluating programs that are justified by some well-founded theoretical reasoning,
because the conclusions from the evaluation are then more likely to generalize. 
Theory provides some guidance about what programs are likely to work and, in
turn, the evaluation of these programs forms a test of the theory’s prediction.
Because prospective evaluations need to be planned ahead of time, designing pilot
programs in such a way that they help answer a specific question or test a specific
theory is also often possible. For example, Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson (2003)
report on a series of randomized evaluations conducted in Kenya in collaboration
with International Christian Support (ICS) Africa, a Netherlands-based NGO active
in the area. They were motivated by the general question: why do so few farmers in
this region of Kenya use fertilizer (only about 10 percent), even though its use seems
to be profitable and it is widely used in other developing countries, as well as in
other regions of Kenya? They first conducted a series of trials on the farms owned
by randomly selected farmers and confirmed that, in small quantities, fertilizer is
extremely profitable: the rates of return were often in excess of 100 percent. They
then conducted a series of programs to answer a number of other questions: Do
farmers learn when they try fertilizer out for themselves? Do they need information
about returns or about how to use them? Does the experiment need to take place
on their farm, or can it take place on a neighbor’s farm? Do they learn from their
friends? To answer these questions, the researchers first randomly selected farmers
to participate in the field trials and followed their adoption of fertilizer subse-
quently, as well as that of a comparison group. Second, they also followed adoption
by the friends and neighbors of the comparison farmers. Finally, they invited ran-
domly selected friends of farmers participating in the trials to the important stages
in the development of the experiment and monitored their subsequent adoption. 
These questions are extremely important to our understanding of technology
adoption and diffusion, and the ability to generate exogenous variation through ran-
domized program evaluation greatly helped in this understanding. Moreover, the
answers also helped International Christian Support Funds develop a school-based
agricultural extension program that has a chance to be effective and cost-effective. A
pilot version of this program is currently being evaluated. 
Thus theory and existing evidence can be used to design informative replication
experiments and to sharpen predictions from these experiments. Rejection of these
predictions should then be taken seriously and will inform the development of the
theory. Replication is one area where international organizations, which are present
in most countries, can play a key role if they take the time to implement randomized
evaluations of programs that can be replicated. An example of such an opportunity
that was seized is the replication of PROGRESA in other Latin American countries.
Encouraged by the success of PROGRESA in Mexico, the World Bank encouraged
(and financed) Mexico’s neighbors to adopt similar programs. Some of these
programs have included a randomized evaluation and are currently being evaluated. 
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Note also that the exogenous variation created by the randomization can be used
to help identify a structural model. Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2001) and
Behrman, Sengupta and Todd (2002) are two examples of such an exercise using the
PROGRESA data to predict the possible effects of varying the schedule of transfers.
These studies rest on assumptions that one is free to believe or not, but at least they
are freed of some assumption by the presence of this exogenous variation. The more
general point is that randomized evaluations do not preclude the use of theory or
assumptions. Indeed, they generate data and variation that can help identify some
aspects of these theories. 
Assessing the Feasibility of Randomized Evaluation
As noted in the introduction, randomized evaluations are not adapted for all types of
programs. They are adapted to programs that are targeted to individuals or commu-
nities and where the objectives are well defined. For example, the efficacy of foreign
aid disbursed as general budget support cannot be evaluated in this way. It may be
desirable, for efficiency or political reasons, to disburse some fraction of aid in this
form, although it would be extremely costly to distribute all foreign aid in the form
of general budget support, precisely because it leaves no place for rigorous evaluation
of projects. However, in many cases randomized evaluations are feasible. 
The main cost of evaluation is the cost of data collection, and it is no more expen-
sive than the cost of collecting any other data. Indeed, by imposing some discipline on
which data to collect (the outcomes of interest are defined ex ante and do not evolve,
as the program fails to affect them) may reduce the cost of data collection relative to
a situation where what is being measured is not clear. Several potential interventions
can also be evaluated in, say, the same groups of schools, as long as the comparison
and treatment groups for each intervention are “criss-crossed.” This has the added
advantage of making is possible to directly compare the efficacy of different treat-
ments. For example, in Vadodara, Pratham implemented a computer-assisted learning
program in the same schools where the remedial education program evaluated by
Banerjee and others (2003) was implemented. The program was implemented only in
grade 4. Half the schools that had the remedial education program in grade 4 got the
computer-assisted learning program, and half the schools that did not have the reme-
dial education program got the computer-assisted learning program. The preliminary
results suggest that the effect on mathematics is comparable to the effect of the reme-
dial education program, but the cost is much smaller. Even keeping the budget of
process evaluation constant, a reallocation of part of the money that is currently
spent on unconvincing evaluation would probably go a long way toward financing
the same number of randomized evaluations. Even if randomized evaluations turn
out to be more expensive, the cost is likely to be trivial in comparison with the
amount of money saved by avoiding the expansion of ineffective programs. This sug-
gests that randomized evaluation should be financed by international organizations. 
Political economy concerns sometimes make not implementing a program in the
entire population difficult, especially when its success has already been demonstrated;
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for example, the urban version of PROGRESA will not start with a randomized eval-
uation, because of the strong opposition to delaying some people’s access to it. This
objection can be tackled at several levels. First, opposition to randomization is less
likely to falter in an environment where it has strong support, especially if a rule
prescribes that an evaluation is necessary before full-scale implementation. 
Second, if, as argued earlier, evaluations are not financed by loans but by
grants, this may make it easier to convince partners of their usefulness, especially
if they permit countries to expand programs. An example of such explicit part-
nership is a study on the effectiveness of HIV/AIDS education currently being con-
ducted in Kenya (Duflo and others 2003). With support from UNICEF, the gov-
ernment of Kenya has put together a teacher training program for HIV/AIDS
education. Because of a lack of funds, the program’s coverage had remained mini-
mal. The Partnership for Child Development, with grants from the World Bank,
is funding a randomized evaluation of the teacher training program. ICS Africa is
organizing training sessions with facilitators from the Kenyan government. The
evaluation allowed training to be expanded to 540 teachers in 160 schools, which
would not have been possible otherwise. The randomization was not grounds for
the Kenyan authorities to reject the program. On the contrary, at a conference
organized to launch the program, Kenyan officials explicitly appreciated the
opportunitythe evaluation gave them to be at the forefront of efforts to advance
knowledge in this area. 
The example of PROGRESA showed that government officials recognized the
value of randomized evaluation and were actually prepared to pay for it. The favor-
able response to PROGRESA and the World Bank’s subsequent endorsement of the
findings will certainly influence how other governments think about experiments.
Several examples of this kind could do a lot to move the culture. 
Third, governments are far from being the only possible outlets through which
international organizations could organize and finance randomized evaluation.
Many of the evaluations discussed so far were set up in collaboration between NGOs
and academics. NGOs have limited resources and therefore cannot hope to reach all
the people they target. Randomized allocation is often perceived as a fair way to allo-
cate sparse resources. In addition, members of NGOs are often extremely entrepre-
neurial, and as a result NGOs are willing to evolve in response to new information.
NGOs tend to welcome information about the effectiveness of their programs, even
if they find out that they are ineffective. For these reasons, many NGOs are willing
to participate in randomized evaluations of their programs. For example, the collab-
oration between the Indian NGO Pratham and Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy researchers, which led to the evaluations of the remedial education and the
computer-assisted learning program (Banerjee and others 2003) was initiated by
Pratham, which was looking for partners to evaluate their program. Pratham under-
stood the value of randomization and was able to convey it to the schoolteachers
involved in the project. International organizations could finance randomized evalu-
ations organized in collaboration with researchers (from their organizations or from
academia) and genuine NGOs. 
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Timing Evaluation and Implementation
Prospective evaluations do take time: convincing studies often go on for two or three
years. Obtaining information about a program’s long-term impact, which can be
extremely important and can differ from the short-run impact, takes even longer. For
example, Glewwe, Illias, and Kremer (2003) suggest that a teacher incentive program
caused a short-run increase in test scores but no long-run impact, which they attrib-
ute to practices of “teaching to the test.” When the program targets children but
seeks to affect adult outcomes, which is the case for most education or health inter-
ventions, the delay between the program and the outcomes may become long. In
these cases, waiting for the answer before deciding whether or not to implement the
program is not possible. 
While this is a real concern, this should not prevent evaluation of the effect of the
program on the first cohort to be exposed to the program. While policy decisions
will have to be taken in the meantime, knowing the answer at some point is surely
better than never knowing it, which would be the case without evaluation. More-
over, obtaining short-term results, which may be used to get an indication of
whether or not the program is likely to be effective, is often possible and may guide
policy in the short run. For example, in the case of the evaluation of the HIV/AIDS
teacher training program, an assessment was performed a few weeks after the pro-
gram was started and while it was still ongoing. Students in the schools where the
teachers were first trained were interviewed about whether the curriculum in their
school covered HIV/AIDS and were administered a knowledge, attitude, and prac-
tice test. The preliminary results suggested that the program was indeed effective in
increasing the chance that HIV/AIDS would be mentioned in class and in improving
students’ knowledge about HIV/AIDS and HIV prevention. These results could be
communicated immediately to the policymakers. 
The first results of an evaluation can also be combined with other results or with
theory to provide an estimate of what the final impact of the program is expected to
be. Obviously, one has to be cautious about such exercises and carefully outline what
comes out of the evaluation results and what is the result of assumptions. One should
set up programs so that long-run outcomes can be tracked that can then vindicate or
invalidate predictions. For example, Miguel and Kremer (2004) combined their esti-
mate of the impact of the deworming program on school participation with estimates
of returns to education in Kenya to provide an estimate of the long-term impact on
adult productivity, which they used to construct their cost-benefit estimates. They are
also continuing to track the children exposed to deworming drugs to directly estimate
the drugs’ long-run effect. 
Finally, delaying some expenditures may actually be worthwhile, given that we
know so little about what works and what does not, especially if this can give us an
opportunity to learn more. It is disconcerting that we do not know more about what
works and what does not work in education, for example, after spending so many
years funding education projects. On this scale, the two or three years needed for an
evaluation, or even the many more needed to obtain information about the long-run
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outcomes, seem a short period of time. It may delay some expenditures, but it will
accelerate the process of learning how to make these expenditures usefully. The U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires randomized evaluation of the effects
of a drug before it can be distributed. Occasionally, the delay the FDA imposes on
the approval of new drugs has created resentment, most recently among associations
representing AIDS victims; however, randomized trials have played a key role in
shaping modern medicine and have accelerated the development of effective drugs.
The Role that International Agencies Can Play
This section discusses current evaluation practices and the role that international
agencies can play in improving these practices. 
Current Practice
The foregoing examples show that obtaining convincing evidence about the impact
of a program is possible by organizing pilot projects, taking advantage of the expan-
sion of existing projects, or taking advantage of project design. While not all pro-
grams can be evaluated using these methods, only a tiny fraction of those that could
potentially be evaluated actually are. Most international organizations require that a
fraction of the budget be spent on evaluation. Some countries also make evaluation
compulsory; for example, the Constitution of Mexico requires evaluation of all social
programs. However, in practice, this share of the budget is not always spent effi-
ciently; for example, evaluations may be subcontracted to untrained consultancy out-
fits that are given little guidance about what they should achieve. Worse, they are
sometimes entrusted to organizations that have an interest in the outcome, in which
case the evaluators have a stake in the results they are trying to establish. 
When an evaluation is actually conducted, it is generally limited to a process eval-
uation, that is, the accounts are audited; the flows of resources are followed; and the
actual delivery of the inputs is confirmed, for example, whether textbooks reached
the school. In addition, qualitative surveys are used to determine whether beneficiar-
ies actually used the inputs (did the teachers use the textbooks?) and whether there
is prima facie evidence that the program beneficiaries were satisfied by the program
(were the children happy?). Process evaluation is clearly essential and should be part
of any program evaluation: if no textbooks were actually distributed, finding that the
program had no impact would hardly be surprising. However, just observing the
beneficiaries’ reactions to a program can lead to misleading conclusions about its
effectiveness. Some programs may, from all observations, seem like resounding suc-
cesses, even if they did not achieve their objectives. The emphasis on process evalua-
tion implies that, more often than not, when impact evaluations take place they are
an afterthought and are not planned for at the time the program starts. 
India’s District Primary Education Program (DPEP), the largest World Bank–
sponsored education program, is an example of a large program that offered the
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potential for interesting evaluations, but whose potential on this count was jeopard-
ized by the lack of planning. The DPEP was supposed to be a showcase example of
the ability to go to scale with education reform (Pandey 2000). Case (2001) provides
an illuminating discussion of the program and the features that make its evaluation
impossible. The DPEP is a comprehensive program that seeks to improve the per-
formance of public education. It involves teacher training, inputs, and classrooms.
Districts are generally given a high level of discretion in how to spend the additional
resources. Despite the apparent commitment to a careful evaluation of the program,
several features make a convincing impact evaluation of the DPEP impossible. First,
the districts were selected according to two criteria: low level of achievement, as
measured by low female literacy rates, but high potential for improvement. In par-
ticular, the first districts chosen to receive the program were selected “on the basis of
their ability to show success in a reasonable time frame” (Pandey 2000, p. 14). The
combination of these two elements in the selection process indicates that any com-
parison between the level of achievement of DPEP districts and non-DPEP districts
would probably be biased downward, while any comparison of improved achieve-
ment between DPEP and non-DPEP districts (difference-in-differences) would prob-
ably be biased upward. This has not prevented the DPEP from putting enormous
emphasis on monitoring and evaluation: the project collected large amounts of data
and commissioned numerous reports. However, the data collection process was con-
ducted only in DPEP districts. These data can only be used to do before and after
comparisons, which clearly do not make any sort of sense in an economy under-
going rapid growth and transformation. If researchers ever found a credible iden-
tification strategy, they would have to use census or national sample survey data. 
The Political Economy of Program Evaluation 
I have argued that the problems of omitted variable bias that randomized evaluations
are designed to address are real and that randomized evaluations are feasible. They
are no more costly than other types of surveys and are far cheaper than pursuing
ineffective policies. So why are they so rare? Cook (2001) attributes their rarity in
education to the postmodern culture in American schools of education, which is hos-
tile to the traditional conception of causation that underlies statistical implementa-
tion. Pritchett (2002) argues that program advocates systematically mislead swing
voters into believing exaggerated estimates of program impacts. Advocates block
randomized evaluations, because they would reveal programs’ true impacts to voters.
Kremer (2003) proposes a complementary explanation, whereby policymakers are
not systematically fooled but have difficulty gauging the quality of evidence, know-
ing that advocates can suppress unfavorable evaluation results. Program advocates
select the highest estimates to present to policymakers, while any opponents select the
most negative estimates. Knowing this, policymakers rationally discount these esti-
mates. For example, if advocates present a study showing a 100 percent rate of return,
policymakers might assume that the true return is 10 percent. In this environment,
if randomized evaluations are more precise (because the estimates are on average
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unbiased), there is little incentive to conduct randomized evaluations because they
are unlikely to be high enough or low enough that advocates will present them to
policymakers. 
Under such circumstances, international organizations can play a key role by
encouraging randomized evaluations and funding them. Moreover, if policymakers
and donors can more readily identify a credible evaluation when examples are
already available, which seems plausible, this role can actually start a virtuous circle
by encouraging other donors to recognize and trust credible evaluation, and thus
advocate the generation of such evaluations as opposed to others. In this way, inter-
national organizations can contribute to a climate favorable to credible evaluation
and overcome the reluctance noted earlier. The process of quality evaluation itself
would then be scaled up above and beyond what the organizations themselves could
promote and finance. 
What International Agencies Can Do 
The foregoing discussion suggests a number of actions that international organiza-
tions could undertake to strengthen the role of evaluations. 
Defining Priorities for Evaluation 
Demanding that all projects be subject to impact evaluation is almost certainly counter-
productive. Clearly all projects need to be monitored to ensure that they actually hap-
pened, and thus to make sure that the international organization is functioning prop-
erly, which is the main responsibility of the organization’s evaluation department.
Some programs simply cannot be evaluated using the methods discussed in this paper,
for example, monetary policy cannot be randomly allocated. Even among projects
that could potentially be evaluated, not all need an impact evaluation. Indeed, the
value of a poorly identified impact evaluation is low, and its cost, in terms of credi-
bility, is high, especially if, as argued later, international organizations should take a
leading role in promoting quality evaluation. 
A first objective is thus to cut down on the number of wasteful evaluations. Any
proposed impact evaluation should be reviewed by a committee before any money
is spent on data collection to avoid a potentially large waste of money. The com-
mittee’s responsibility would be to assess the ability to deliver reliable, causal esti-
mates of the project. A second objective would be to conduct credible evaluations
in key areas. In consultation with a body of researchers and practitioners, each
organization should determine key areas for which it will promote impact evalua-
tions. Organizations could also set up randomized evaluations in other areas when
the opportunity occurs. 
Setting up Autonomous Impact Evaluation Units 
Given the scarcity of randomized evaluations, there may be some scope for setting up
a specialized unit to encourage, conduct, and finance randomized impact evaluations
and to disseminate the results. Such a unit would also encourage data collection and
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the study of true natural experiments with program-induced randomization. As
noted earlier, randomized evaluations are not the only way to conduct good impact
evaluations: when randomization is infeasible, other techniques are available. How-
ever, such evaluations are conducted much more routinely, while randomized evalu-
ations are much too rare given their value and the opportunities for conducting them.
They also have common features and would benefit from a specialized unit with spe-
cific expertise. Because impact evaluation generates international public goods, the
unit could finance and conduct rigorous evaluations in the key areas the organization
identifies. 
Setting up an autonomous unit would have several advantages. First, it would
ensure that conducting evaluation is a core responsibility of a team of people. Sec-
ond, this unit would be free of the fire-walling requirements that are necessary to
make the evaluation divisions of international organizations independent, but
make prospective evaluations difficult. For example, the director of the World
Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department reports directly to the board, and the
department’s teams are prevented from establishing close connections with the
implementation team. This makes a prospective randomized evaluation essentially
impossible. Third, randomized evaluation and nonrandomized evaluation should
be clearly separated to avoid the “scaling down” effect caused by the political
economy of evaluation. 
Banerjee and He (2003) argue that the World Bank’s decisions and reports have
little impact on market decisions or on subsequent debates, that is, that the World
Bank does not seem to have the role of a leader and promoter of new ideas that
it could have. This may be in part because everybody recognizes that the World
Bank, perhaps legitimately, operates under a set of complicated constraints, and
that what justifies its decisions it not always clear. Credibility would require the
Bank to be able to separate the results generated from randomized evaluation
from the data reported by the rest of the organization. The results of studies pro-
duced or endorsed by the unit could be published separately from other World
Bank documents. 
Working with Partners 
An evaluation unit would have a tremendous impact in terms of working with part-
ners, in particular, NGOs and academics. For projects submitted from outside the
unit, a committee within the unit, perhaps with the assistance of external reviewers,
could receive proposals from within the international organizations or from outsiders
and choose projects to support. The unit could also encourage the replication of
important evaluations by sending out calls for specific proposals. Many NGOs
would certainly be willing to take advantage of the opportunity to obtain funding.
NGOs are flexible and entrepreneurial and can easily justify working with only some
people, because they do not serve the entire population. The project could then be
conducted in partnership with people from the unit or other researchers, especially
academics, to ensure that the team has the required competencies. The unit could
provide both financial and technical support for this project with dedicated staff and
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researchers. Over time, based on the experience acquired, the unit could also serve as
a more general resource center by developing and disseminating training modules,
tools, and guidelines for randomized evaluation. It could also sponsor training
sessions for practitioners. 
Certifying and Disseminating Evaluation Results 
Another role the unit could serve, after establishing a reputation for quality, is acting
as a certifying body, clearinghouse, and dissemination agency. To be useful, evalua-
tion results need to be accessible to practitioners within and outside the development
agencies. A role of the unit could be to conduct systematic searches for all impact
evaluations, assess their reliability, and publish the results in the form of policy briefs
and in a readily accessible and searchable database. The database should include all
the information needed to interpret the results (estimates, sample size, region and
time, type of project, cost, cost-benefit analysis, caveats, and so on), as well as some
rating of the validity of the evaluation and references to other related studies. The
database could include both randomized and nonrandomized impact evaluations and
clearly label the different types of evaluation. Evaluations would need to satisfy min-
imum reporting requirements to be included in the database, and all projects sup-
ported by the unit would have to be included in the database, whatever their results.
This would help alleviate the publication bias problem, whereby evaluations that
show no results are not disseminated. While academic journals may be uninterested
in publishing the results of programs that failed, from the point of view of policy-
makers, this knowledge is as useful as knowing about projects that succeeded. Ideal-
ly, over time, the database would become a basic reference for organizations and
governments, in particular, as they seek funding for their projects. This database
could then jump-start a virtuous circle, with donors demanding credible evaluations
before funding or continuing projects, more evaluations being done, and the general
quality of evaluation work rising. 
Conclusion: Using Evaluation to Build Long-Term 
Consensus for Development 
Rigorous and systemic evaluations have the potential to leverage the impact of inter-
national organizations well beyond their ability to finance programs. Credible impact
evaluations are international public goods: the benefits of knowing that a program
works or does not work extend well beyond the organization or the country imple-
menting the program. Programs that have been shown to be successful can be
adapted for use in other countries and can be scaled up within countries, while unsuc-
cessful programs can be abandoned. By promoting, encouraging, and financing rig-
orous evaluations of the programs they support, as well as of programs others sup-
port, the international organizations could provide guidance to the international
organizations themselves, as well as to other donors, governments, and NGOs in the
ongoing search for successful programs, and thereby improve the effectiveness of
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development aid. Moreover, by credibly establishing which programs work and
which do not, the international agencies could counteract skepticism about the effec-
tiveness of spending on aid and build long-term support for development. This is the
opportunity to achieve real scaling up. 
Notes
1. See http://www.unicef.org/programme/lifeskills/priorities/index.html.
2. The World Bank is not immune to recommending programs whose effectiveness has not
been established. A publication by Narayanan (2000) lists a series of programs recom-
mended by the World Bank, of which few have been evaluated (Banerjee and He 2003).
3. PROGRESA is so called from the Spanish acronym for Program for Health, Education,
and Nutrition.
4. See http://www.ifpri.org/themes/progresa.htm.
5. To make this point precisely, one would need a full cost-benefit analysis of both programs
to see whether the same improvement in human capital were achieved with the same
expenditure. The paper on India does not yet include a cost-benefit analysis. 
6. Galasso, Ravallion, and Salvia (2002) use the same technique to control for endogenous
take-up of a subsidy voucher and training program in Argentina, and Banerjee and others
(2003) use it to control for the fact that only two-thirds of the schools allocated to the
treatment group actually received the remedial education teachers. 
7. A representative from a large organization once objected to the idea that randomized eval-
uations could be taught and “were not nuclear physics.” His answer was that “studying
human beings is much more complicated than nuclear physics.” This exactly makes the
point that, unlike for physics, there are no general laws of human behavior, and therefore
nothing general can be said. 
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